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NOTES
WILD POLITICAL DREAMING:
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMATION OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
Scott J. Bowman*
"No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking
down the lines which separate the states, and of compounding the
American people into one common mass. ' '
INTRODUCTION
Virginia was the largest state in 1790, with a population of 747,550.2
With a population of 59,096, Delaware was the smallest,3 giving it, per
capita, nearly thirteen times the political power of Virginia in the
Senate. As of July 1, 2003, California had a population of 35,484,453
and Wyoming a population of 501,242, providing the residents of
Wyoming with more than seventy times the political power of
Californians in the Senate. Despite this growing discrepancy in
political power, the United States Senate has, in certain respects,
become a more representative body through the expansion of the
franchise and the institution of direct elections.5 It should become
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. This Note grew out of a
seminar paper written for Professor James E. Fleming, who helped develop many of
the ideas found herein. The Note also benefited from the thoughtful comments of
Dean William M. Treanor, as well as the overall encouragement of Professor
Elizabeth Cooper. Many thanks to my parents for making law school a possibility and
to T for making it a joy.
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819).
2. See 1790 State Level Census Data, University of Virginia Geospatial and
Statistical Data Center, Historical Census Browser, available at
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/histcensus (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
3. Id.
4. See U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Population Estimates by State, available at
http://eire.census.gov/popest/datalstates/tables/NST-EST2003-O1.php (last visited Jan.
15, 2004); see also Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution
Whose Time Has Gone? 13 J.L. & Pol. 21, 24-29 (1997) (explaining how the allocation
of representation in the Senate gives small states disproportionate power).
5. See U.S. Const. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years; and each Senator shall have one vote."); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
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even more so. As population disparities continue to grow, the
arguments for restructuring the Senate will become increasingly
compelling.
The question then becomes: Even if we wanted to, could we do
anything to change the Senate? Article V of the Constitution-which
plainly provides that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate" 6-- tends to support the accepted
view that we can do little. The Framers did not want subsequent
generations to restructure the Senate using the "normal" procedures
for amendments outlined in Article V.7  However, as drafted and
ratified, Article V remains internally inconsistent to this day.8
The inconsistency resulted from a compromise between the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention who were more nationalist
and those who were more federalist.9 The final clause of Article V
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) ("We realize that changes in the structure of the
Federal Government have taken place since 1789, not the least of which has been the
substitution of popular election of Senators by the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment in 1913, and that these changes may work to alter the influence of the
States in the federal political process.").
6. U.S. Const. art. V.
7. Article V of the Constitution provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be
made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any
Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first
Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate.
Id.
8. This inconsistency is not surprising considering that the Equal Suffrage Clause
represents a compromise. See The Federalist No. 62, at 316-17 (Alexander Hamilton
or James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1948). Of course, the Entrenchment Clauses are
not the only compromises found in the Constitution. Article III requires the creation
of a Supreme Court and any lower courts that Congress may see fit to create. See U.S.
Const. art. III ("The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish."). This compromise represents the result of debate regarding
the nature and need for lower federal courts:
[B]oth nationalists, like Randolph and Hamilton, and more pro-state
delegates, like Paterson, initially seem to have been united in a desire to
create an independent national judiciary consisting of at least a supreme
court with constitutionally established jurisdiction.... These initial
proposals differed only on the need for and manner of creation of inferior
federal courts and in the manner of appointment of federal judges.
Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest
for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 762 (1984).
9. See The Federalist No. 39, at 195 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1948)
("[The Constitution] is neither wholly national, nor wholly federal.... In requiring
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protects this compromise." Its language, however, need not be read
to permanently entrench the Senate's structure. Congress could
simply amend the Equal Suffrage Clause out of the Constitution and
be done with it. Congress has this pure power. But would such an
assertion of power be constitutional given what we know, or think we
know, about the Framers' intent and original understanding?
It has been suggested that simple exertion of political will can
accomplish most anything,' regardless of its legitimacy. This Note
argues that Article V itself gives such political exertion legitimacy by
creating a supermajority process for amending the Constitution.12 As
far as Article V is concerned, 3 there is no distinction between what
can be done pursuant to its supermajority procedures and whether it is
constitutional to do so. 4  Specifically, this Note argues that an
amendment eliminating the Equal Suffrage Clause-leading the way
to the restructuring of the Senate-would be constitutional, regardless
of the Framer's intent to the contrary. 5 Such an amendment would
more than a majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by states, not by
citizens, it departs from the national, and advances toward the federal character."); see
also infra Part I.
10. U.S. Const. art. V ("[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its
equal Suffrage in the Senate.").
11. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 233 (1993) ("[I]n the long run a strong
majority of the electorate can eventually make the constitution conform to its political
will. This is simply a fact about political power as such. There is no way around this
fact, not even by entrenchment clauses that try to fix permanently the basic
democratic guarantees.").
Throughout much of the work regarding limitations on amendments this
distinction between political will and formal legality is distinguished from legitimacy.
See, e.g., Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of
Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 251, 277 (1996)
("Although an unamendable amendment may be technically legal, it would be
imprudent to make such an amendment." (emphasis added)). This Note suggests that
in many instances simple exertions of political will are not legitimate means of
altering the Constitution. However, it just so happens that Article V itself legitimates
certain manifestations of political will-as realized during the use of the procedure set
forth in the article itself.
12. See U.S. Const. art. V (where a particular manifestation of political will is
defined as the mode for amending the Constitution); see also infra Part III.
13. It should be emphasized that the arguments about constitutional legitimacy
relate to Article V. This Note does not argue that the realization of political will is
always constitutionally legitimate. Article V, however, does clearly express a system
of determining what is a legitimate constitutional change that embodies a particular
form of political will.
14. See Katz, supra note 11, at 276 (referring to authors who believe "that some
basic fundamental principles in the U.S. Constitution are, or should be, inviolate").
Conflating whether aspects of the Constitution are "inviolate" with whether they
should be muddles an important part of the examination of limitations on the
Constitution. This Note addresses why Article V scholars should limit their
arguments to the "are" and leave the "should be" to the political process.
15. U.S. Const. art V.
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allow us to re-strike the balance of values embodied in our Senate's
representational scheme. 6
Part I of this Note examines the text of Article V and the Framers'
debate about the preferable form for the Senate. Part II explores
theories regarding amendment of the final clause of Article V as well
as alteration of the Constitution more generally. 17 Part III argues that
the Senate should be reformed through the passing of two
amendments: the first removing the Equal Suffrage Clause and the
second restructuring the Senate.
I. THE DRAFTING OF ARTICLE V
Article V presents the following mechanism for amending the
Constitution:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in
either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of
the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by
Congress. 18
16. See infra Part III.
17. In addition to the theories mentioned in Part II, Professor Bruce Ackerman
also offers an interesting view of amending the Constitution outside Article V in his
book, We the People: Foundations. See 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Foundations (1991); see also Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of
Amending Clauses, 13 Const. Comment. 107, 109 (1996) (arguing "that it is naive to
identify 'amendment' only as formal textual additions (or subtractions)"). This Note
only focuses on those theories that address the alteration of the formal text itself. See
infra Part II. Professor Amar's reliance on history and originalism makes his work
particularly relevant to the discussion herein even when this Note rejects an approach
that gives the historical understanding of Article V dispositive weight when
interpreting the text. When explaining why he focused on Amar's views instead of
Ackerman's in discussing Article V, Professor Henry Paul Monaghan noted:
First, Ackerman purports to find legitimate constitutional change in the
contemporary political consent of "We the People"; Amar, by contrast,
attempts to enlist the traditional trappings of constitutional legitimacy-
historical support and original understanding.... Second, as noted above,
the relevance of this debate is highlighted by the fact that the outcome of
recent important Supreme Court cases has turned upon judicial
understandings of the original understanding of federalism.
See Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 121, 130-31 (1996). In addition,
Professor Ackerman himself believes Article V should be amended to incorporate
more popular sovereignty. See Ackerman, supra, at 54-55. While this Note only
describes how the Equal Suffrage Clause could be altered, the procedure itself could
be changed as well.
18. U.S. Const. art. V.
SENATE REFORMATION
The language appears to open the door to revision of any sort. 9
However, the Framers included two caveats to ensure ratification of
the Constitution:2
0
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year
One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect
the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article;
and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate.
21
The limitations struck a balance between nationalist and federalist
forces. 22
The Equal Suffrage Clause directly addresses the issue of
restructuring the Senate. The Senate was originally designed as a
counterweight to the more representative House of Representatives. 3
The Senate would, in the words of Madison, offer "more coolness,
with more system, & with more wisdom" than its companion branch.24
As such, it calmed the fears of the small states that the new
government would eliminate them as equal sovereigns.25 As stated in
The Federalist No. 62, the equal vote in the Senate "is at once a
constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in
the individual states, and an instrument for preserving that residuary
sovereignty. ' 26  The Senate itself, however, was not a sufficient
protection against usurpation of power by larger states. The Equal
Suffrage Clause served as an additional barrier to the formation of a
Congress based purely on proportional representation.27
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part I (discussing the text of Article V and the compromises it
represents).
21. U.S. Const. art. V.
22. See The Federalist No. 62, supra note 8.
23. See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens'
Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500, 509 (1997) (noting that
the debates in the Constitutional Convention regarding the Senate touched on two
major themes, one being that "the Senate should counter the democratic excesses of
the people, newly represented in the House of Representatives").
24. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 151 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter 1 Farrand]; see Bybee, supra note 23, at 509 (citing this passage).
In his notes on the debates of June 7, 1787, Madison recorded the feelings of Mr.
Dickinson regarding the strengths of the proposed Senate:
[H]e wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters,
distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and bearing
as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible; and he thought
such characters more likely to be selected by the State Legislatures, than in
any other mode.
1 Farrand, supra, at 150.
25. See Bybee, supra note 23, at 509 (noting that the Senate was meant to "serve
as a check on the inexorable impulse of the new government to accretion of power").
26. See The Federalist No. 62, supra note 8, at 317.
27. See The Federalist No. 43, at 225 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1948)
("The exception in favour of the equality of suffrage in the senate, was probably
meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the states, implied and secured
2004] 1021
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This approach to the Senate was not universally accepted among
the Framers. James Wilson 2' argued-as recorded by Madison-that
the new government should get its power from a unitary source: the
People.29 Wilson believed that if the two houses of Congress derived
their power from different sources-one from the states and the other
from the People-"dissentions [would] naturally arise between
them."30  As an alternative to equal suffrage of the states, Wilson
proposed a "Senate to be elected by the people as well as the other
branch, and the people might be divided into proper districts for the
purpose."31 At the other end of the "representational" spectrum was
George Read, who argued that the "Executive Magistrate" should
appoint senators from a list compiled by the state legislators.32
The ultimate form of the Senate was a moderate middle road
between these extremes. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts expressed
his views on the various proposals, providing possible insight into the
collective thought process that led to the Senate's ultimate form:
[Four] modes of appointing the Senate have been mentioned. 1. by
the [first] branch of the National Legislature. This would create a
dependence contrary to the end proposed. 2. by the National
Executive. This is a stride towards monarchy that few will think of.
3. by the people. [T]he people have two great interests, the landed
interest, and the commercial including the stockholders. To draw
both branches from the people will leave no security to the latter
interest; the people being chiefly composed of landed interest, and
erroneously, supposing, that the other interests are adverse to it. 4[.]
by the Individual Legislatures. The elections being carried thro' this
refinement, will be most likely to provide some check in favor of the
commercial interests agst. the landed; without which oppression will
take place, and no free Govt. can last long when that is the case.33
by that principle of representation in one branch of the legislature; and was probably
insisted on by the states particularly attached to that equality.").
28. Akhil Amar gives James Wilson's populist arguments a great deal of weight.
See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
29. See 1 Farrand, supra note 24, at 151.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see infra note 112 (where alternative forms of the Senate are suggested
which would maintain its better qualities-smaller size, deliberative nature, etc.).
Wilson saw his proposal as ensuring the independence of the new national
government. He did not see his view as destroying the states, simply as leaving them
to local governance:
The state governments ought to be preserved-the freedom of the people
and their internal good police depends on their existence in full vigor-but
such a government can only answer local purposes-That it is not possible a
general government, as despotic as even that of the Roman emperors, could
be adequate to the government of the whole without this distinction.
1 Farrand, supra note 24, at 157.
32. 1 Farrand, supra note 24, at 151.
33. Id. at 152.
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Madison concluded this passage by noting that Mr. Gerry "was
therefore in favor of [the] last" suggestion.34
In the end, the model the Framers decided upon may have been
based on a principled view regarding the role of states as checks on
the excesses of national popular representation. It is also possible,
however, that the vote on the Senate simply represented a realization
that it was a necessary compromise, a "lesser evil."35 In either case,
the language in the Constitution creating the Senate36 and in Article V
limiting its reformation37 is clear regarding the Senate's composition.
Whether this language represents an unabashed embrace of a
particular notion of representational democracy, a pragmatic political
compromise, or both, we are left with the language to apply in light of
our current values.38
It is crucial, therefore, to determine whether we can read the
limitation created by the Equal Suffrage Clause to extend more
broadly than the express language would suggest. One may look to
the Framers' underlying intent or even the understanding among
those who ratified the document. However, their intentions were
34. Id.
35. See The Federalist No. 62, supra note 8, at 316-17. The Federalist No. 62
describes the Senate as a simple nod to "prudence" and the need to bring the smaller
states on board. See id.
36. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and
each Senator shall have one Vote.").
37. See U.S. Const. art. V.
38. This Note draws a fine line between formalism and originalism. An
underlying foundation of the argument in this Note is the view that constitutional text
should be readable and applicable by the general public. Therefore, the people
should be empowered to read and debate the text without needing to be experts in
constitutional history or theory to do so. Courts should also be free to do so in light
of current thinking and realities. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
2003 WL 21468502, at *21 (N.Y. Jun. 26, 2003) ("Indeed, a sound basic education
back in 1894, when the Education Article was added, may well have consisted of an
eighth or ninth grade education, which we unanimously reject. The definition of a
sound basic education must serve the future as well as the case now before us.").
The arguments herein are based on a rejection of strict adherence to original
intent, and derive from a notion of our relationship with the Constitution. It is,
however, not possible (nor would the author of this Note be able) to take on original
intent in all its facets within the space of this Note. It should simply be noted that
rejection of originalism does not require rejection of history and its teachings. With
that said, there is a difference between simply enforcing the will of the Framers and
determining what we today intend, informed by any wisdom we find in their writing.
For example, we should choose to live in a country where our liberty is protected, not
simply because the Framers thought so but because they were right to think so.
Likewise, we have, rightly, rejected the Constitution's support for the liberty-denying
institution of slavery. The only solution is to enforce the language of the Constitution
to realize what we today determine to be the best charter for our government. This
Note tries to explain that the language puts some hurdles in the way of doing so too
rashly, but is not able, nor should it be able, to construct an absolute bar to
restructuring the Senate if we see fit.
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diverse39 and led to language representing a compromise. Therefore,
this Note looks at the language as read today by lay people
empowered to interpret our governing charter.40 What we collectively
believe the Constitution permits can be expressed through the
supermajority political process defined in Article V.
That Article V lays out a simple road map is the most obvious
reading of Article V:41  Congress may amend any part of the
Constitution as long as it does not alter the equal suffrage of any state
in the Senate without the state's consent.42 Yet, this interpretation
need not prevail. The following part discusses different ways to read
such Constitutional text, laying the foundation for this Note's
argument that the Equal Suffrage Clause is surmountable without
resorting to sources of authority beyond Article V.
II. THEORIES ON AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
There are those who argue that Article V "means what it says, '43
namely, that the impermissibility of restructuring the Senate without
the consent of the states could not be clearer. Others disagree. In
addition, there are scholars who believe that, no matter what Article
V says,44 certain constitutional provisions cannot be constitutionally
amended. The following subsections present some examples.
A. Elimination of the Equal Suffrage Clause
In their article, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has
Gone?,45 Lynn A. Baker and Samuel H. Dinkin briefly discuss the
39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40. It should be noted that courts have addressed the issue of Article V exclusivity
both directly and indirectly. The United States Supreme Court took on the issue of
the reach of Article V in the National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920). In that
decision, the Court held that the Eighteenth Amendment was a valid part of the
Constitution. Id. at 386. Scholars have argued that, in so doing, the Supreme Court
"reject[ed] the claim that the Senate Suffrage Clause should be read broadly to
prohibit fundamental alterations in the federal system." See Katz, supra note 11, at
279; see also Trinsey v. United States, No. CIV.A. 00-5700, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18387, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2000) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the Electoral
College was unconstitutional, finding that "[a]ny successful effort to alter the
Constitution requires strict adherence to systematic procedures" (citing U.S. Const.
art. V)). In other words, amendments passed pursuant to Article V, and only Article
V, are part of the Constitution "for all Intents and Purposes," as any language found
in the document as originally drafted. See U.S. Const. art. V.
41. See infra Part III (arguing that it therefore may be used to amend anything).
42. See U.S. Const. art. V.
43. David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of
Article V, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 4 (1990).
44. This Note is a testament to the fact that what Article V really says is
controverted.
45. 13 J.L. & Pol. 21 (1997).
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possibility of amending the final clause of Article V, 4 6 citing Akhil
Reed Amar, who had referenced the idea.47 Baker and Dinkin argue
that whether or not we deem the Equal Suffrage Clause amendable,
the Senate could be restructured through alteration of other, more
clearly amendable, parts of the Constitution.48
Not all scholars who have addressed the topic agree. One has
characterized a "two-step process" to get around the Entrenchment
Clauses as "disingenuous. '49 Another has argued that even though a
wholesale elimination of the Senate should be deemed valid,5° any
46. Id. at 69 ("[T]he Senate clause of Article V is itself arguably subject to repeal
or change under the general procedures outlined within the Article.").
47. Id. at 69-70 n.186 (citing Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed:
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1994)).
48. Baker and Dinkin surveyed some of the possibilities in their article. See id. at
68-84. The authors first reference the possibility explored in this Note, suggesting that
"at least as a theoretical matter" amending Article V is possible through the
procedures provided therein. Id. at 69. Even if altering Article V were deemed
unconstitutional, Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution could be amended to place
legislative powers into a one chamber Congress where representation is based on
population. Id. at 70. Baker and Dinkin also offer an interpretation of Article IV-
which relates to the subdivision and union of existing states-that would permit large
states to subdivide to create proportional representation in the Senate. Id. at 72. They
then suggest that one might argue to a court that the current scheme dilutes minority
votes in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, yet note that the Court's
interpretation of that Amendment would make success quite unlikely. Id. at 74-75.
Therefore, Baker and Dinkin turn to the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and
examine the possibility of making the argument that "the existing structure of
representation in the Senate systematically affords members of racial minorities less
representation than it provides non-Hispanic whites." Id. at 75. They then turn to the
possibility of a "large-state 'work stoppage,"' where the Representatives in the House
from the nine largest states would not appear on the floor, preventing a quorum. Id.
at 81-83. Finally, the authors note the possibility of revolt through rebellion or the
political process. Id. at 83-85. This final possibility, though unlikely anytime soon, is
not entirely far-fetched, they argue, considering "that fully [seventy-two] percent of
the American population currently resides in the [eighteen] states that today receive
disproportionately little representation in the Senate." Id. at 84 n.255.
This Note argues that such other routes, whatever their strength or potential,
are unnecessary since the Equal Suffrage Clause may be constitutionally eliminated
through simple amendment pursuant to Article V procedures. See infra Part III.
49. Thomas E. Baker, Exercising the Amendment Power to Disapprove of
Supreme Court Decisions: A Proposal for a "Republican Veto," 22 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 325, 340 n.47 (1995).
50. Douglas Linder has made this argument:
The case for affirming the constitutionality of an amendment abolishing the
Senate must be based on a holistic theory of constitutional interpretation.
Such a theory would allow one to argue that actions inconsistent with the
language of one constitutional provision may nonetheless be constitutional if
affirmation of their constitutionality is necessary to effectuate the broad
design of the Constitution. Thus, the framers' broad belief, embodied in
article five, in the desirability of a constitution flexible enough to
accommodate major alterations in the structure of government should be
honored because it was "more basic" than the framers' specific belief that
the right of states to equal suffrage in the Senate should never be eliminated
by amendment.
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change that "represents an effort to dilute the influence in the Senate
of the smaller states ... should be declared invalid under the article
five equal suffrage proviso"51 because allowing an amendment which
"violat[es] ... a provision limiting the power of amendment... would
be to allow Congress to do an act forbidden by the Constitution. 5 2
Viewing Article V as preventing the dilution of the small states' power
in the Senate is the most intuitive reading of that article.
Nevertheless, there are those who argue that the Constitution can be
amended without reference to Article V itself.
B. Amendment Through Referendum: Akhil Reed Amar
In two prominent articles,53 Akhil Reed Amar argues that the
Constitution may be constitutionally amended outside of Article V.54
Under this theory, "extra-Article V" methods would be readily
available to circumvent the Equal Suffrage Clause." His theory
demonstrates great flexibility in altering and interpreting the
Constitution.56
Amar begins his argument by looking at "what Article V does not
say."57 He rejects the notion that Article V excludes other modes of
constitutional change, arguing instead that the procedure provided for
in Article V is simply the exclusive method the government may use to
amend the Constitution.58 This provision for governmental change of
See Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 Ariz. L. Rev.
717, 726-27 (1981).
51. Id. at 727.
52. Id. at 725.
53. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Consent]; Akhil
Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia].
54. See generally Amar, Consent, supra note 53; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note
53.
55. If Amar's theory is correct, amending the Equal Suffrage Clause would still be
legitimate but doing so through Article V would simply be the means available only
to the government. This Note argues that Article V is the only means available to
anybody and may not be limited. But see Amar, Consent, supra note 53, at 505 (while
a simple majority may alter the Constitution, it is limited when it attempts to disrupt
the constitutional scheme, for example, an amendment eliminating the First
Amendment).
56. Professor Amar does provide textual arguments regarding references to "the
People." See Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 53, at 1065 (noting the "majoritarian
strand[s]" found in the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments). However, in the end
his argument rests on the belief that the text of Article V refers to the government
exclusively even though there is no language on the face of Article V suggesting that.
See Monaghan, supra note 17, at 132 ("The process of constitutional interpretation
would be paralyzed if the simple absence of the qualifier 'only' meant that a clause
was not 'exclusive,' as Professor Tribe persuasively shows." (citing Laurence H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221, 1241-45, 1273-76 (1995))).
57. Amar, Consent, supra note 53, at 459.
58. See id. ("[Tihere is an alternative way of understanding the implied exclusivity
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the Constitution "nowhere prevents the People themselves, acting
apart from ordinary Government, from exercising their legal right to
alter or abolish Government via the proper legal procedures."59 Amar
comes to this conclusion "[b]y widening [his] focus beyond the narrow
text of Article V to consider other parts of the original Constitution,
various glossing provisions of the federal Bill of Rights, and various
Article V analogues in state constitutions."'  The answer to whether
Article V is exclusive cannot be found in its text alone. Rather,
sources of legitimate amending power "lie outside Article V, narrowly
construed."'" Such an interpretation should be informed by our
recognition that the Constitution "is not simply a text, but an act.
62
The act was defined by the sovereign people of each state exercising
their inalienable right to alter their government.63 In this way, our
Constitution was a legitimate act even though it apparently ran
contrary to the text of the Articles of Confederation. 6
Amar's arguments regarding the non-exclusivity of Article V rely a
great deal on the thinking of James Wilson.65 Wilson "was one of only
six men to sign both the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution" and was, according to Amar, outshone in importance
only, if at all, by Madison.66 Amar cites Wilson's belief "that the
people may change [their] constitutions whenever and however they
please" because "in our governments, the supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable power remains in the people."'67  This power is
of Article V: it enumerates the only mode(s) by which ordinary Government-
Congress and state legislatures-can change the Constitution.").
59. Id.; see Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 53, at 1044 ("I believe that the first,
most undeniable, inalienable and important, if unenumerated, right of the People is
the right of the majority of voters to amend the Constitution-even in ways not
expressly provided for by Article V.").
60. Amar, Consent, supra note 53, at 461.
61. Id. (continuing that the sources are found "in other provisions of the
Constitution, in the overall structure and popular sovereignty spirit of the document,
in the history of its creation and amendment, and in the history of the creation and
amendment of analogous legal documents, such as state constitutions").
62. Id. at 462.
63. Id. at 464.
64. Id. at 464-65 ("[I]nconsistency is not illegality."); see id. at 473 (citing The
Federalist No. 39 where Madison wrote that the "Constitution is to be founded on the
assent and ratification of the people of America ... [and] derived from the supreme
authority in each State-the authority of the people themselves" (alteration in
original)); see also Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 53, at 1051-52 ("The Constitution
was in fact lawfully ratified in Massachusetts and its sister states because a bare
majority of the People... had a legal right to amend their constitution-even in the
teeth of a pre-existing constitutional provision that specified a different, and
seemingly exclusive, mode of amendment.").
65. Amar, Consent, supra note 53, at 474.
66. Id. ("In the 1780s, Wilson was universally regarded as perhaps the most
brilliant, scholarly, and visionary lawyer in America.").
67. Id. (citing 2 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on
the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 432 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1881) (1836)
(internal quotations and emphasis omitted)).
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manifested through majoritarianism, Amar says, and he rejects the
argument that the state (and Federal) constitutional amending
provisions simply "implement[ed] ... the people's right to alter or
abolish."6  To the contrary, it was understood that the people's
inalienable right could be manifested through a majoritarian process.6 9
This majoritarian process was not affected by the text of Article V:
"[A]lthough Article V is best read as the exclusive mode of
governmental amendment absent participation by the People, it should
not be understood as binding the People themselves, who are the
masters, not the servants-who are, indeed, the source-of Article V
and the rest of the Constitution."7 Therefore, Amar believes that a
national referendum would be an appropriate method of altering the
Constitution.71
Such a majoritarian scheme is a bedrock of our system, according to
Amar.72 In his view, the scheme need not be formally embedded in
our Constitution, for it was vested permanently in the people.73
Nevertheless, in addition to exploring the text of state constitutions
and the views of prominent drafters, Amar also locates justifications
for his view in the text; the Preamble as well as the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments demonstrate a commitment to popular sovereignty.74
Therefore, Amar argues that we cannot-and Article V could not
through its federalist procedures and Entrenchment Clauses75-
alienate our right to alter the Constitution through a majority vote.
68. Id. at 481 (emphasis omitted).
69. Id. at 482.
70. Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 53, at 1055.
71. Id. at 1044-45 (proposing the possibility of amendment through referendum).
72. Id. at 1050 (claiming that the "first principles" at the time of the Framing were
"that the People were sovereign, and that a majority of them enjoyed the inalienable
legal right-that is, a right that they were incapable of waiving, even if they tried-to
alter or abolish their form of government whenever they pleased").
73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 53,
at 1057 (relating that a proposed prefix to the Preamble asserting the right of the
people to alter the government "was dropped because it was deemed redundant").
But see Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the
Constitution, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 35 (1992) (arguing that "[d]emocracy is not
majoritarianism" and that "special voting rules" can be justified for amendment).
74. See Amar, Consent, supra note 53, at 489-94; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note
53, at 1056-57.
75. See Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 53, at 1068 ("For if (1) Article V were the
exclusive mechanism and (2) the importation proviso [entrenching the slave trade
until 1808] legally prohibited use of Article V, then we would be logically driven to
the illogical conclusion that the People had somehow alienated their inalienable right
to amend."); id. at 1070 ("We the People of the United States can lawfully restrict-
and indeed through Article V have lawfully restricted-the powers of Congress, state
legislatures, and state conventions over Senate representation; but We have not-We
could not-limit Our own power to alter or abolish even this seemingly entrenched
feature of our government."). Amar goes on to argue that maybe we should
restructure the Senate, id. at 1071 n.98, but argues that to do so we must use an extra-




Unlike Amar, there are those who believe that Article V is clearly the
sole source of constitutional change.76 These Article V formalists
believe that the Constitution is clear on this point: there are
procedures for amending, as well as one surviving substantive limit on
such amendments. David R. Dow is an Article V formalist of this
sort, and Part II.C. briefly examines his views in order to provide a
measure of contrast with the breed of formalism this Note offers in
Part III.
C. Article V Formalism: David R. Dow
Article V formalists believe that Article V "means what it says.""
Illustrating this perspective, David R. Dow has argued "that the only
way to amend the Constitution is in accordance with the mechanism
outlined in article V" and "that the mechanism outlined in article V is
clear [and] exclusive."78 This view leads Dow to reject theories such
as Amar's.79 Dow claims that unresolved conflicts in the Constitution
do not make its provisions any less valid.80 He criticizes the "gnawing
institutional hunger [that] drives constitutional theorists to struggle to
fit all the pieces of the puzzle neatly together," in order to find "a holy
grail of constitutional law."81
Unlike Amar who claims that popular sovereignty is a principle
Article V could not supplant,82 Dow suggests that Article V exclusivity
is based on the "bedrock principle of federalism."83 He suggests that
arguing otherwise would inevitably lead to the destruction of the
states.' In so doing, Dow does not reject popular sovereignty per se;
rather, he simply asserts that "our commitment to popular sovereignty
is not truly germane" because it "is our normative commitment to the
principle of majority rule" that is of greatest importance. He adds
that "this commitment is partial, not absolute."86
Dow's work is meant to counter theories, such as Amar's, that find
76. See generally Monaghan, supra note 17.
77. See Dow, supra note 43, at 4.
78. See id.; cf. Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 53, at 1072 ("We cannot say that a
set of words is supreme law simply because the words say so.").
79. See supra Part II.B. (reviewing Amar's arguments).
80. See Dow, supra note 43, at 7-8 (arguing that the attempt to resolve all conflicts
is often misguided and is based on the outmoded and "continuing allure of the pre-
Realist, law-as-science mode of thinking").
81. Id. at 8.
82. See supra Part II.B.
83. Dow, supra note 43, at 61.
84. Id. The fact that it may lead to the weakening, or even destruction of the
states, does not make it per se illegitimate. The Constitution strikes a balance
between the national and the federal. See The Federalist No. 39, supra note 9, at 195.
We are permitted to amend it pursuant to Article V to change the weight of each.
85. Dow, supra note 43, at 10; see also id. at 11 ("The notion of popular
sovereignty and the principle of majority rule are conceptually distinct.").
86. Id. at 10.
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sources of legitimacy outside of Article V and argue that popular
sovereignty requires majoritarianism.87 Dow believes that law may
derive its power from the people without necessarily adhering
religiously to majoritarianism. s In our scheme of government, simple
majorities are not free to "do whatever they want simply because they
are majorities."89  Therefore, legitimate constitutional alteration is
defined by the dictates of Article V.
Relying on Article V exclusively to legitimate alteration of the
Constitution does not require unquestioning adherence to original
intent. Dow writes:
[I]t is a mistake to attempt to ascertain the "original understanding"
of our beliefs. It is an especial mistake when matters of the
Constitution are concerned because we may find if we look (and if
we are honest) that what the framers believed is not in fact what we
today believe; we may find that the political theory subscribed to by
the framers is not the theory that animates our polity. What we
know is what we believe, and it is upon these beliefs that our polity
rests. That is as it ought to be.90
Nevertheless, Dow argues that the historical record supports the
view that Article V is the exclusive method of altering the
Constitution.91 Perhaps more importantly, the simple structure of our
government requires such a conclusion: Even if the Framers'
intentions were "unfathomable... the invocation of [expressio unius
87. See supra Part II.B.
88. Dow writes:
Irrespective of whether the framers believed the theory of popular
sovereignty to be prescriptive or descriptive, the idea of popular sovereignty
does not entail rule by majority will, and the rule of majority will clearly is a
normative, a prescriptive, rule.... Popular sovereignty is not necessarily
majority will. Law can come from the people-however understood-
without coming from political majorities. Although popular sovereignty can
be understood as fifty percent plus one, it can also be understood as a
plurality, a supermajority, or even the will of an appointed oligarchy of
lawmakers.
Id. at 12-13 (emphases in original).
89. Id. at 16. Dow adds parenthetically: "I say that the majority may not, not that
it cannot, for saying that it cannot would be a statement about power, and what we
truly believe is that even if a majority does have the power it may not exercise it." Id.
(emphases in the original).
90. Id. at 22-23 (emphasis in the original).
91. Id. at 41-44. In summary, Dow writes:
The concerns of the framers were, in this area as perhaps in others, quite
practical as opposed to abstractly theoretical. They wanted the Constitution
to be amendable, but not too amendable. They wanted their work to be
subject to revision, but they did not want it to be jettisoned in moments of
passion. The requirement of supermajorities, the distinctive core feature of
article V, achieves the framers' goal of making the amendment process a
slow, deliberative one. At the same time, it reflects the belief, prevalent
among the framers and prevalent now, that certain rights are not subject to
interference by mere majorities.
Id. at 42 (emphasis in the original).
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est exclusio alterius9 2] would be appropriate, for article V must be
understood as exclusive, not precisely because the framers expected it
to be, but because the structure of the government they established
depends upon its exclusivity."93 In rejecting Amar's theory of extra-
Article V modes of amendment, Dow embraces a certain level of
contradiction within our constitutional scheme: We can both value
majority rule and limit it at the same time.94 He sees Article V as an
example of a constitutional provision containing a permissible and
inevitable tension.95
While these scholars focus on the procedures used to amend the
Constitution, there others who argue that, regardless of the
procedure, there are implied limitations on amendments.
D. Implied Limitations on Amendments: The Looming Shadow of
Constitutional Values
Some believe that, regardless of the process used, certain
amendments would be inherently unconstitutional. 6 This belief is
based on the notion that certain amendments would be so at odds
with basic constitutional values or principles that they would be
denunciations, not simply amendments, of our Constitution. Walter
F. Murphy, discussing the possible treatment of a hypothetical racist
amendment, has written: "[T]he Court could explain and justify
protection of human dignity as the principle value in the American
constitutional system and thus reason that because the amendment
violates that basic value, it is invalid."97 James E. Fleming has argued
that believing all amendments are constitutional begs "the question by
unreflectively assuming a false equivalence among the amending
92. Id. at 39 ("The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.").
93. Id. at 40 (emphasis in the original). Later in the article, Dow fleshes out the
many levels in which Amar's majoritarian approach is unconstitutional:
In light of the constitutional structure of sovereignty, relying on a national
majority to ratify proposed amendments rather than on majorities in discrete
states is unconstitutional in the truest sense: It departs from the
unmistakeable language of the text as well as the concerns underlying the
choice of such language. It is also inconsistent, not merely with the words of
the Constitution, but with the constitutional structure of sovereignty and
with our beliefs from which that structure emanates.
Id. at 58.
94. See id. at 8 (claiming that "we believe in ... majority rule," yet "[a]t the same
time, we also believe that not everything ought to be subject to it").
95. See id. at 58 (quoting The Federalist No. 39, where Madison wrote about
Article V: "In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the
proportion by States, not by citizens, it departs from the national and advances toward
the federal character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of
States sufficient, it loses again the federal and partakes of the national character"
(emphases in original)).
96. This group includes Amar. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
97. Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev.
703, 756 (1980).
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power, the Constitution, and the constituent power."9 One student
Note has argued that an amendment wholly or partially eliminating
the effect of the First Amendment would be unconstitutional since it
would be contrary to "natural rights 'retained by the people."'99
Amar has argued that popular sovereignty is an inalienable right left
"unbound" by other principles found in our constitution: "Individual
rights, federalism, separation of powers, and ordinary representation
all exist under our Constitution, but they all derive from a higher
source."1 ° In this way, the legitimacy of an amendment is not simply
a question of politics or procedure, but of principle as well.
Others, however, root limitations on amendment power in the
ordinary workings of government. Laurence Tribe has argued that
the merits of any particular amendment is "a true 'political
question'-a matter that the Constitution addresses, but that it
nevertheless commits to judicially unreviewable resolution by the
political branches of government.""1 1  Tribe's argument leaves the
political process-in addition to the stringent amending procedure-
as the check against abusive or unwise amendments. 102 Viewing
constitutional amendments in this way does not require one to give up
98. James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American People, 11 Const. Comment.
355, 373 (1994); see also William L. Marbury, The Limitations Upon the Amending
Power, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 223, 225 (1919) ("It may be safely premised that the power to
'amend' the Constitution was not intended to include the power to destroy it."). But
see Baker, supra note 49, at 339-40 ("Supreme Court majorities have consistently and
repeatedly concluded that there are no implicit limits on the content of amendments
that may be proposed and ratified, thus evidencing the seeming tautology that a
provision properly added to the Constitution cannot be unconstitutional."); Richard
B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 497, 548 (1992) ("If [a proposed amendment] is
ratified, then it is part of the Constitution, and becomes constitutional by
definition.").
99. See Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?,
100 Yale L.J. 1073, 1073 (1991).
100. See Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 53, at 1103 (emphasis in original); see also
id. at 1103 n.211 (arguing that "[d]ifferent visions of the Constitution's essence may
lead to different implied limitations on constitutional amendment" and concluding
that popular sovereignty trumps principles such as federalism).
101. Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a
Restrained Judicial Role, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 443 (1983).
102. Clearly this is an attractive view to not only those trying to strengthen the best
principles in the Constitution, but also unfortunately to those who would like the
Constitution to embody the worst values in our society. For example, Senator James
Murray Mason, later delegate to the Provisional Congress of the Confederacy,
declared from the floor of the 36th Congress:
What power makes a Constitution? Under the present Constitution, three
fourths of the States.... [A]nd if they find this clause there, which declares
that it shall not be altered, is not that as much in their power as any other
clause? And if it is not, why is it not? Senators may say there is good faith
in it. There is political faith in it; there is propriety of law-I mean of moral
law-in it; but there is nothing more. Cannot the power that made unmake?
Does anybody deny that?
Cong. Globe 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1387 (1861) (remarks of Sen. Mason).
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on principle; it only eliminates one forum-the judicial branch-from
the options available to prevent harm caused by an imprudent or
unprincipled amendment. Therefore, the following part argues that a
constitutional amendment striking the final clause of Article V would
be constitutional, forbidden neither by a formalist reading of Article
V nor by implied limitations on amendment.
III. AN ARGUMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL "UN-ENTRENCHING" OF
THE EQUAL SUFFRAGE CLAUSE
We, as American citizens, are empowered by Article V to
reconstitute the United States Senate. The Framers created the
structure within which we work, but we may nevertheless interpret
and apply the language as modern-day framers. Part III.A. explains
that we should embrace popular sovereignty while remaining
textualists when interpreting Article V, and that doing so will lead to
permissible reformation of the Senate. °3 Part III.B. attempts to
resolve some of the issues that arise with such an argument, such as
potential abuse of the amending power,1 rejection of federalism as an
independent barrier to reformation of the Senate, 1°5 and a disregard
for the text only when it suits the argument.10 6 This Note concludes by
arguing that we may reconstitute our government to reflect the reality
of our current political and social world.0 7
A. Embracing Popular Sovereignty and Textualism
The Equal Suffrage Clause cannot prevent the restructuring of the
Senate through an amendment to the Constitution. It is surmountable
in a few different ways. First, even if one believes Article V must
strictly further the will of the Framers, we could restructure the
Senate after acquiring the consent of any state or states that would be
disenfranchised.' A second possibility is for amendment outside of
Article V through a national referendum-the approach Amar
supports.' 9 He claims that if a national referendum were held passing
103. See infra Part III.A.
104. See infra Part III.B.1.
105. See infra Part III.B.2.
106. See infra Part III.B.3.
107. See infra notes 205-17 and accompanying text.
108. See Katz, supra note 11, at 285 ("For example, an amendment to reduce the
number of Senators from North Dakota to one would not be unconstitutional.
Rather, it would require-in addition to the regular amending process described in
Article V-a vote of consent from the State of North Dakota."). But see Levinson,
supra note 17, at 122 n.32 ("Contrary to what is sometimes asserted, the Senate clause
is not 'unamendable' as a matter of theory, though, as a practical matter, that is
almost certainly the case, given the extreme unlikelihood of, say, Wyoming agreeing
to give up its excess of power in the Senate.").
109. See supra Part II.B. (reviewing the arguments of Akhil Amar).
2004] 1033
1034 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
a new amendment, that amendment would be a valid part of the
Constitution. 10
There is a third approach that is true to the text, even if not to any
of the generally accepted understandings of original intent: the
passage of two amendments (or of a two-part amendment)."' The
first would strike the Equal Suffrage Clause from the Constitution and
the second would reapportion the Senate."2 These two steps would
not only be technically possible,"' but would also be constitutional
and deserve principled support. A two-part process would be a
manifestation of popular sovereignty-of our own power to alter our
government-that remains true to the text of the Constitution.
The argument presented here should not be confused with the
belief that because anything could be amended as a technical matter,
as a "simpl[e]... fact about political power as such,"'14 this gives any
such amendment legitimacy. To hold that belief would be to
conflate 5  legitimacy and prudence." 6  Article V mandates a
110. Id.
111. See Amar, Consent, supra note 53, at 461 (discussing the imprecision of Article
V, Amar asks "couldn't the 'equal suffrage' rules of Article V be easily evaded by two
successive 'ordinary' amendments, the first of which repealed the equal suffrage rules
themselves, and the second of which reapportioned the Senate?").
112. Regardless of how the Senate is restructured, the Senate could still maintain
its deliberative nature, see Bybee, supra note 23, at 513 (noting that "[t]he lengthy
term for senators ensured a long view of problems"), yet would fall more in line with
its preferable role as protector of national interests. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995) (stating that Congress "owe[s] primary allegiance
not to the people of a State, but to the people of the Nation"); see also, Amar,
Philadelphia, supra note 53, at 1071 n.98 ("In advocating a proportionately
representative Senate, I am by no means suggesting that other differences between
the House and Senate be diminished."). Although it would not completely solve the
population disparity problem, simply giving a small number of the largest states an
additional senator would at least help offset the immense imbalance now in place. See
supra note 4 and accompanying text (regarding current populations of the largest and
smallest states). If California were to receive a third senator, and Wyoming were to
lose one, the disparity in representation would shrink from 70.41 times to 23.47 times.
Although this is still quite a disparity, it at least gets us closer to the disparity
experienced by the original thirteen states. Such a proposal would obviously be
incredibly unpopular in states with small populations, and would be viewed as an
inappropriate usurpation of political power by large states. However, this view is
based on the notion that the original division of representation was not an
inappropriate usurpation resulting from the small colonies' leverage during the
original drafting of the Constitution. In any event, as noted already, the context has
changed and we are still empowered to be framers if we so choose.
113. Pursuant to Article V procedure, the final clause of Article V could be
stricken or declared without effect. Subsequent to this, another amendment could be
passed altering representation in the Senate.
114. Rawls, supra note 11, at 233; see also Dow, supra note 43, at 52 ("Saying that
the people have the power to alter their government, however, is quite different from
saying that they have the right to do so, which is to say that they may do so lawfully.");
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of
Amendment Fever, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 691, 700 (1996) ("Perhaps a properly enacted
constitutional amendment cannot literally be unconstitutional.").
115. See Fleming, supra note 98, at 373 (making the opposite move, claiming that
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distinction between these two concepts."7 It provides for how one
may amend the Constitution and defines this process as a certain type
of political will.'18 We may amend the Constitution pursuant to the
procedure laid out in the first half of Article V. 119 As long as the
Equal Suffrage Clause is still part of the Constitution, we may not use
this ordinary procedure to alter the Senate. However, we may turn
Article V upon itself, removing the Equal Suffrage Clause from the
text. As David Dow writes, Article V "means what it says. 120
However, Article V may not "say" what some think it obviously does.
Believing that political will can be equated with legitimacy should
not entail acceptance that it always does.'2' One may simply recognize
that Article V itself creates a standard for determining the legitimacy
of constitutional amendments. 22  That is, this Note's argument
addresses only the legitimacy of constitutional amendments, not all
manifestations of popular will. 23 Altering the Constitution through
an "Amarian" referendum would be unconstitutional not because it is
a manifestation of popular will, but because it is the wrong
manifestation. 124 A sufficiently-determined majority might be able to
those who believe amendments are inherently constitutional "unreflectively assum[e]
a false equivalence among the amending power, the Constitution, and the constituent
power"); see also Dow, supra note 43, at 40 (arguing that Amar's "argument ... that
the power to amend resides in the people irrespective of whether it is granted by
article V... conflates notions of physical power and legal right"); Monaghan, supra
note 17, at 151 ("I believe that Amar... conflates questions of legality and legitimacy.
The ratification debates reflected a widespread belief that, whether 'illegal' or not,
ratification of the new Constitution would establish a legitimate national
governmental order, and thereby establish a new basis for measuring legality.").
Measured against the Constitution, an amendment striking the Equal Suffrage Clause
would be legal and constitutionally legitimate. Whether it is legitimate measured
against other principles we embrace as a nation is a different question.
116. Whether it is wise or principled to do something is a question of prudence.
Whether something is consistent with the text of the Constitution, however, will be
described as a question of legitimacy.
117. See infra note 124 and accompanying text (arguing that Article V itself
legitimizes a particular manifestation of political will).
118. See id.
119. See U.S. Const. art. V.
120. Dow, supra note 43, at 10.
121. In other words, it is conceivable that in certain schemes political will
manifested in any way, whether majoritarian or not, would be the basis for
constitutional legitimacy. We, however, do not live in such a scheme.
122. See U.S. Const. art. V.
123. For instance, to elect a President or pass laws in Congress the Constitution
provides for different mechanisms, whether electors or elected representatives. It is
important to note, however, that these procedures also place barriers between simple
majoritarian rule through referendum and formal governmental action.
124. See Dow, supra note 43, at 13 ("Majority rule is a practical (and normative)
rule of who wins. Popular sovereignty is a theoretical view of who does, or who ought
to, have power. Neither notion entails the other."). It just so happens that Article V
defines which form of popular sovereignty counts and, in doing so, who wins.
Nevertheless, even the Framers recognized that majority will is a difficult force to
stop:
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amend the Constitution through sheer force, but doing so would not
make the amendment constitutional. 125  In contrast, a similarly
determined supermajority could amend constitutionally as long as
they conformed to the mechanisms set out in the first part of Article
V. More than Amar might lead one to believe, the text matters,
although not in the way he or Article V formalists like Dow would
suggest.
Moreover, not only is it constitutional to amend any part of the
Constitution using the mechanisms provided in Article V, but the
same applies to Article V itself. In essence, the Framers created an
inconsistency-although a dormant one thus far-when they tried to
create a procedure for amending the Constitution while also placing
limits on amendments. This Note posits that the substantive
limitation can be overcome if ever seriously challenged. If Congress
proposed and the states ratified an amendment striking the Equal
Suffrage Clause from the Constitution, it would be legitimate. 126 It
might be unwise, politically imprudent, and even unprincipled in some
people's eyes, but these questions are outside the scope of
constitutional legitimacy once the Constitution has been altered
pursuant to Article V.127  Otherwise, whether a provision is
constitutional simply becomes a question of prudence defined by
differing views of what our Constitution is meant to embody.
That debate should be left to "we the people" and our arguments
about the language of the Constitution. Once new language is
injected into the Constitution, however, it is the Constitution, and one
Though I trust the friends of the proposed constitution will never concur
with its enemies, in questioning that fundamental principle of republican
government, which admits the right of the people to alter or abolish the
established constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their
happiness; yet it is not to be inferred from this principle that the
representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to
lay hold of a majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions
in the existing constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a
violation of those provisions; or that the courts would be under a greater
obligation to connive at infractions in this shape, than when they had
proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body. Until the
people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the
established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as
individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments,
can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act.
But it is easy to see, that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude
in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the constitution, where
legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the
community.
The Federalist No. 78, at 400 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1948) (footnote
omitted).
125. See The Federalist No. 78, supra note 124, at 400.
126. For some views on implied limitations, see supra Part II.D.
127. See infra Part III.B.3.a. (noting that the clause would still make it politically
more difficult to restructure the Senate).
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should judge its legitimacy by the procedure used to enact it rather
than a previous constitutional order that no longer exists. 21 Such a
belief does not require silence in the wake of an amendment. We may
hold the amended Constitution up against our aspirations, against
what we believe to be the most principled charter for our government.
But when making such arguments regarding national or personal
values, one should not leap to the assumption that one's (or even the
Framers') view of what is right is perfectly aligned with what is
constitutional. 12
9
Those who would argue that "unentrenching" the Equal Suffrage
Clause is unconstitutional, contrary to the text and clear intent of the
Framers, must address the entrenchment of the slave trade. 3° That
clause lapsed in 1808 and is therefore easier to avoid. If one is to
argue that the intent of the Framers-as manifested in the
Entrenchment Clauses-is to be honored without exception, then the
Thirteenth Amendment' would have been unconstitutional if the
slave trade had been entrenched until 1868, instead of 1808. It is easy
to see the inherent contradiction between slavery and freedom. Our
current sense of morality casts a dark shadow upon what was once
embedded in our constitutional scheme, and which was once deemed
by many of the Framers to be a central institution in American life.
As Dow has observed:
What we believe today will not always be what was once believed.
Theories like those I discuss in this Article pay far too much
attention to what was once believed at the expense of analyzing
what we today believe. This is a terrible mistake when we are
dealing with constitutional notions like freedom, right, and liberty.
For example, it seems quite clear to us today that the conception of
liberty prevalent among the framers was dependent upon and
inextricably connected to the institution of slavery, the subjugation
of blacks.132
Of course, this Note does not try to equate the institution of slavery
with the Senate. The comparison is used simply to highlight that
contradictions reside in the Constitution and that we are free to
eliminate them. Simply because the contradiction found in the Equal
128. See supra note 102 (remarks of Sen. Mason).
129. If we did so, it would be hard for us to argue that slavery was an evil since it
was permitted at one time by the Constitution. It is too easy to say that it is no longer
permitted and therefore our Constitution embodies our greatest ideals. There is no
reason to think that inconsistencies remain, and to recognize that many great ideals
are in the text, many are not, and that some parts of our Constitution still need some
refining.
130. See U.S. Const. art. V ("Provided that no Amendment which may be made
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect
the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article.").
131. U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
132. Dow, supra note 43, at 7 n.29.
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Suffrage Clause is not as striking nor the harm in any way as severe
should not make it safe from evaluation and revision.
Whether there are provisions that cannot be removed from or
added to our Constitution legitimately strikes at the heart of any
interpretation of Article V. As already noted, many have argued that
there are certain constitutional principles that may not be eliminated
legitimately from the Constitution.133 There are those, however, that
argue that what is constitutional is simply what is in the
Constitution. 34 Richard B. Bernstein addressed this issue in an article
about the Twenty-Seventh Amendment:
May Congress or the courts reject a constitutional amendment,
otherwise validly ratified, as unconstitutional? The conventional
and common-sense answer to this question is "No. Before an
amendment is ratified, it is just a proposal-nothing more and
nothing less. If it is ratified, then it is part of the Constitution, and
becomes constitutional by definition.' ' 35
This common-sense answer is rather compelling. To believe this does
not require rejection of the important values in our Constitution.136 It
simply requires we find an alternative source for these values in the
event the Constitution is altered. But, as Bernstein notes in his piece,
this "common-sense approach" is not accepted by many scholars, 137
who "have suggested that certain amendments could be so threatening
to the fabric of the constitutional system that they might well be
deemed unconstitutional.1 38
Adherence to such implied limitations improperly imports values
from the Constitution pre-amendment to the Constitution post-
amendment. Once the document has been altered, it is debatable
whether a valuable principle has been lost, but a court should not find
the loss to be unconstitutional. 39 The way to prevent a reordering of
the current Constitution is to argue against it in the political arena,
where we retain control over our Constitution as present-day framers.
We should not rely on the fact that there are inherent or unwritten
limitations on such changes. 4 °
133. See supra Part II.D.
134. Id.
135. Bernstein, supra note 98, at 548.
136. See infra note 141 (citing such values).
137. Bernstein, supra note 98, at 548-49.
138. Id. at 549. Bernstein cites Walter F. Murphy, who, contemplating a
hypothetical constitutional amendment, writes: "[T]he Court could explain and justify
protection of human dignity as the principle value in the American constitutional
system and thus reason that because the amendment violates that basic value, it is
invalid." See Murphy, supra note 97, at 756.
139. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Part II.D. (discussing the issue of implied limitations). One can
even argue about the nature of our constitutional scheme to demonstrate how
disruptive a particular amendment might be to the ordering of our government. This
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One might argue that this Note's argument drains vital principles
out of the Constitution and represents an overly technical and narrow
reading of a Constitutional passage. Clearly, the Constitution
embodies many abstract principles1 41 that are often read too narrowly
and with an undue emphasis on original meaning and tradition.
142
Article V is not such a provision. It lays out a procedure for amending
the Constitution and also attempts to place limits on such
amendments. 43 Regardless of what the Framers might have wanted
or the values they tried to embed in the text, they faced an inherent
limitation. As a written document, a constitution is limited by the
force of language.1" Language allows concepts such as equality to be
re-interpreted with each generation. 45  But language cannot both
provide for the amendment of any part of the Constitution as well as
protect a substantive provision from alteration. 46
Altering Article V (and restructuring the Senate) is consistent with
an abstract reading of the Constitution. We are free to interpret the
language of the Constitution, to determine what is now "due
process"'' 47 or "cruel and unusual,"'48 and to likewise reassess whether
the Equal Suffrage Clause is still consistent with our values.
Certainly, this is not to suggest that Article V does not embody the
value of federalism. 49 But Article V's embrace of federalism should
Note only suggests that it would be incorrect to claim that such arguments are really
about legitimacy, and not about prudence, principle, or preference.
141. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I ("freedom of speech"), amend. IV
("unreasonable searches and seizures"), amend. V, XIV § 1 ("due process" and "just
compensation"), amend. VIII ("Excessive" and "cruel and unusual"), amend. XIII §
2, XIV § 5, XV § 2, XIX, XXIII, XXVI § 2 ("appropriate legislation"), amend. XIV §
1 ("equal protection") (emphases added).
142. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.) ("We
refer to the most specific level [of generality] at which a relevant tradition protecting,
or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified."); Robert H. Bork, The
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 240 (1990) (claiming that
even Scalia's view, while the most defensible on the Court, "assumes an illegitimate
power, and the limitation will prove no restriction at all when there is only a general,
unfocused tradition to be found").
143. See U.S. Const. art. V.
144. Contra Amar, Consent, supra note 53, at 462 (claiming that the Constitution
"is not simply a text, but an act").
145. For example, see the progress and expansion of rights from Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896) to Brown v. Board of Education., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). No
relevant constitutional text changed in the ensuing years, yet the interpretation of the
language and its requirements certainly did. The Supreme Court of Canada adopted
this view of constitutions generally in Hunter v. Southam [1984] S.C.R. 145, 155: "A
constitution ... is drafted with an eye to the future.... It must ... be capable of
growth and development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities
often unimagined by its framers."
146. Again, the language does create a barrier, just not an insurmountable one. See
infra Part III.B.3.a.
147. U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV.
148. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
149. It does so by protecting states as somewhat equal, sovereign political units.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
not make it safe from attack if the country determines that democratic
notions of equality require a more representative Senate. The
American people could determine that they place a greater value on
the concept of equal representation than on the equal treatment of
states as political entities.15 ° This determination should, and does,
have an outlet for expression.
The Constitution embodies great principles, but the document also
has embedded within it contradictions that we are free to reconcile,
regardless of what the Framers might have intended. Walter Murphy
has written:
The plain words of a constitutional document often.., foster...
disputes. In the American framework, one need look no further for
examples than the potential conflict between the first amendment's
guarantee of free exercise of religion and its ban against
establishment of religion, or the first amendment's protection of
freedom of the press and the sixth amendment's guarantee of a fair
trial.151
Likewise, we have a constitutional scheme which not only reflects a
respect for the unity and equality of American citizens,152 but which
explicitly provides for it.153 Our scheme also values federalism, 54 but
See U.S. Const. art. V; The Federalist No. 39, at 195 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed.,
1948) ("[The Constitution is] neither wholly national, nor wholly federal.... In
requiring more than a majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by
states, not by citizens, it departs from the national, and advances toward the federal
character.").
150. This proposition is true even in light of the balance struck by the Framers
between proportional and equal voting. As noted in The Federalist No. 62, the U.S.
Congress combines two different notions of representation:
If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one
nation, every district ought to have a proportional share in the government:
and that among independent and sovereign states, bound together by a
simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an equal
share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason,
that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal
character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the
principles of proportional and equal representation.
The Federalist No. 62, supra note 8, at 316.
151. See, Murphy supra note 97, at 710.
152. See, e.g., U.S. Const. pmbl. (elevating the goals of "the common defence" and
"the general Welfare").
153. See U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. Although referring to Article I and not the
Equal Suffrage Clause explicitly, Samuel Freeman has commented on the conflict
between the value of equal representation and the structure of the Senate:
[T]here is a problem with the provision by Article I for geographic
representation in the Senate. At first appearance it runs counter to equal
rights of political jurisdiction. Suppose it cannot be shown reasonably
acceptable among equals. Then it would be inconsistent with constitutional
democracy, the ideal of political relations that infuses our constitution.
Freeman, supra note 73, at 35 (noting, in addition, that "[iut is... a separate issue
whether it is for the courts (rather than the citizens) to declare this provision in the
Constitution invalid").
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in its continued evolution, 55 and with the greater protection of civil
rights, 56 this value has slowly given way to individual equality and
more democratic representation.'57 This Note's breed of formalism is
simply to read the words as they are meant today, to interpret them in
light of what we might now consider important constitutional values.
With that said, the longstanding value we have given to
federalism 15 is powerful, and provides a constitutional basis for
arguing against changes to the Senate. If there is sufficient
widespread support for an amendment removing the Equal Suffrage
Clause, however, such reformation would be constitutional.' 59 This is
true even if, as an individual, one believes it to be imprudent or
inconsistent with the specific dictates or overarching structure of the
Constitution. In short, being constitutional need not mean being
"good.,,"6
154. Indeed, federalism itself can be seen to protect individual rights. If people
believe it is a superior method for doing so, then they are free to fight any attempts to
reform the Senate. But, if Americans determine that a more representative Senate is
in line with our current values, we are free to make the requisite changes within the
confines of Article V procedure.
155. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. XVII (providing for the popular election of
Senators).
156. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2003).
157. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."); amend. XVII; amend.
XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not by denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."); amend. XXVI, § 1
("The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of age.").
158. See The Federalist No. 62, supra, note 8.
159. This Note has argued against an Amarian referendum as a legitimate
manifestation of popular will. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Amar is right to
argue that we, today, have the power to be modern-day framers:
There are great organizational advantages to this system of representation,
but there are also obvious associated agency costs. The ultimate power to
reassess those costs, and redefine the terms of agency, if deemed
appropriate, must always rest with We the People Ourselves-you, me and
our fellow citizens, here and now.
Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 53, at 1086.
160. Making such an argument does not imply a rejection of grand principles. To
the contrary, part of the motivation for writing this Note stems from concern that
undue attention would be given to the underlying principles of our Constitution
during upcoming amendment discussions. Instead of being a call for more
amendments, this Note is partly calling for caution and for vigilance amongst the
citizenry. If imprudent or unprincipled amendments are proposed, it should not be
assumed that there is any barrier to them becoming full parts of the Constitution
beyond the procedures of Article V and our own political voices. We as citizens are
ultimately responsible for maintaining the "goodness" of our governmental charter.
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B. Resolving Some of the Issues Raised by "Unentrenching" the Equal
Suffrage Provision
1. Abuse of the Amending Power
Some might claim that this Note imagines idealistically that any
political desire to eliminate the Equal Suffrage Clause will be driven
by the goal to reform the entire Senate. The more likely scenario,
they might argue, would be an attempt by most states to
disenfranchise one or more other states. The Framers wished to avoid
this outcome, and the Equal Suffrage Clause clearly addresses this
problem.' t But that does not mean the clause itself is free from
revision. It merely creates a political barrier to the alteration of the
Senate.162 This barrier would be particularly high if states attempted
to disenfranchise an individual state (which would be contrary to the
underlying principles of representative democracy) rather than make
the Senate better reflect demographics (which would be more
consistent with the underlying principles of representative
democracy). Again, the Framers could not completely prevent this
danger from coming to pass, unless, of course, they had provided no
procedure for amending the Constitution. 63  However, under the
current procedures of Article V, if forty-nine states attempted to
disenfranchise the remaining state, it would be up to those taking part
in the political process to argue against the invidious and abusive use
of the amending power.
Such principled arguments would not be the only barrier to such
abuse. As will be noted, the Equal Suffrage Clause does create a
political barrier to restructuring the Senate."6 In addition, some
might argue that federalism would remain a barrier to restructuring
the Senate even after the Equal Suffrage Clause had been removed.
2. Federalism as Extant Barrier
One might argue that even if the Equal Suffrage Clause were
eliminated, the procedure set forth in Article V would not permit
alteration of the Senate. If the value of federalism is not a sufficient
obstacle to restructuring the Senate, why should we use a procedure
that relies on the equality of states and not of individuals? Why not
turn to Amar's view of majoritarian adaptation of the Constitution? 6
161. See U.S. Const. art. V ("[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its
equal Suffrage in the Senate" (emphasis added)).
162. See infra Part III.B.3.a.
163. See Monaghan supra note 17, at 145 (referring to Sherman's motion during the
Constitutional Convention that Article V be struck out of the Constitution). Amar
would still argue that the Constitution could be altered. See Part II.B.
164. See infra Part III.B.3.a.
165. See supra Part II.B.
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This Note rejects Amar's view, however, not because it embraces a
value absent from the Constitution,166 but rather because it has no
clear connection with the specific text of Article V,167 which should be
seen as the sole source of legitimate amending power.
Rejecting the legitimacy of majoritarian alteration does not require
rejecting the value of popular sovereignty as Amar presents it.168 To
the contrary, his view of popular sovereignty fits nicely with the
argument that government should be more representative, and that
popular will and government action should be more directly linked. 69
This argument is one of the main reasons the Senate should be
reformed. To argue that reform would be beneficial is different from
claiming that the evolution toward greater popular sovereignty 7 °
legitimates a constitutional change through a referendum. We can
freely discuss how to better represent ourselves and, to that end, how
to alter the Constitution, but we are only permitted to do so through
the mechanisms provided by the Constitution. 7' This approach
creates the surest form of constitutional democracy, combining
contemporary responsibility for our government and its foundational
principles with an appropriate adherence to the textual limitations
found in the Constitution. When these two principles conflict, we are
free to use the tools provided by the Framers to alter the substance of
the Constitution-even those parts they tried most to ensure against
amending.'72 As the next section addresses, the text, not the Framers'
intent, is what matters, and the two can be distinguished.
166. Certainly, popular sovereignty is embedded in our Constitution. See, e.g., U.S.
Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that "[riepresentatives ... shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included in this Union, according to their
respective Numbers").
167. See Monaghan, supra note 17, at 131 ("To restrict Article V to governmentally
sponsored amendments is to impose a limitation that the Article does not facially
contain.").
168. In an article discussing Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional change,
James E. Fleming asks: "Is it possible to articulate a constitutional theory that gives
due regard to popular sovereignty but that also takes Article V seriously as
prescribing the exclusive procedures for amending the Constitution?" We the
Unconventional American People, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1513, 1529 (1998). This Note's
author would like to think it is.
169. It should also be noted that even if Amar is correct in believing that the
Framers, or even some of them, believed in such extra-Article V change, this alone is
not sufficient to make it legitimate. Regardless of their intent, the language is clear.
The Constitution is a written text written to survive its drafters. Therefore, great care
was put into the language used, and rightly so. The Framers' intent is not what
matters, only their intent as manifested in language, language we are left to interpret
as the People.
170. Surely, one may believe there has been no such evolution or that it has been
an unfortunate occurrence. This does not change the argument. If enough people
believe it has occurred and that it is a beneficial development, they may lobby for
further change through the procedures provided by the Constitution.
171. See U.S. Const. art. V.
172. Clearly, a measure of conflict may be desired and deemed outweighed by the
protection federalism might provide. But, there is a tension nonetheless that may be
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3. Consistently Taking the Text Seriously
Some might respond that when it comes to how to amend, this Note
points to the text,173 but when it comes to what can be amended, it
claims that we can disregard the words. 74 However, the words of the
Equal Suffrage Clause, while amendable, still act as a limitation. First,
the very existence of the clause creates a political barrier to
amendment.175 Second, an amendment that simply tries to alter the
Senate without first eliminating the clause would be
unconstitutional. 176  Third, and most importantly, the argument
against the legitimacy of eliminating the clause is based partially on an
unjustified belief in implied limitations. 7 7 For such an amendment to
be unconstitutional, 78 one must argue that an unwritten limitation
would survive such amending. To the contrary, once the Constitution
has been altered in accordance with Article V, we can no longer point
to the preexisting Constitution as a source of legitimacy because that
Constitution-its scheme-no longer exists. These three arguments
will be addressed in the following subsections.
a. Entrenchment as Political Barrier
Article V formalists, as well as originalists, would claim that this
Note's argument drains the Equal Suffrage Clause of any meaning,
that it gives the Equal Suffrage Clause no purpose in our
Constitution. 79  To the contrary, the clause's presence in the
Constitution certainly makes it harder to alter the Senate as a
practical, if not formal, matter by expressing a clear intention of the
Framers.8 ° But if this intention contradicts our current values, 8' an
resolved through Article V procedures, and would thereafter define our
Constitutional scheme. See Monaghan, supra note 17, at 157 ("Ideas such as the
desirability of popular sovereignty and the wish for a government 'neither wholly
national nor wholly federal' pulled in different directions." (footnote omitted)).
173. See supra Part III.A.
174. See supra Part III.A.
175. See infra Part III.B.3.a.
176. See infra Part III.B.3.
177. See supra Part II.D. (regarding implied limitations),
178. It is important to note again that when referring to legitimacy this Note's
author is making an argument about constitutional legitimacy and not prudence.
Although it would be imprudent to amend away the First Amendment, this Note's
argument rejects implicit limits and therefore would permit doing so, something
others would not deem legitimate.
179. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
180. See Linder, supra note 50, at 722 ("[lIt has been suggested that the [Equal
Suffrage] provision is 'merely declaratory."' (citing remarks by Senator Bigler in
regard to the Corwin Amendment found in Cong. Globe 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1387
(1861))). The proposed Corwin Amendment would have provided that: "No
amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to
Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic
institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of
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amendment passed eliminating the Equal Suffrage Clause is a
permissible and constitutional evolution in our constitutional
structure. 182
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule addressed this issue in an
article on legislative entrenchment:
In originalist terms, the Article V entrenchment of equal state
suffrage would have been meaningless, and would thus have failed
to reassure the small states who desired the entrenchment, if there
were a background understanding among the Founding generation
that the entrenchment clause could simply be repealed through the
ordinary process of constitutional amendment. 183
As noted, we may repeal the clause through the "ordinary process."
However, the historical reality Posner and Vermeule describe would
certainly inform any political debate surrounding such an amendment.
The form of the Senate should only be altered if the procedures of
Article V are met."8 Nevertheless, whether Congress chooses to act
will inevitably be informed by the words in the Equal Suffrage Clause.
In order to realize the political consensus required by Article V,185
supporters of Senate reform would have to overcome the political
obstacle of the clause. Although original understanding would not
make its removal unconstitutional, it would certainly make any
attempt more politically difficult. 86  The Framers may have
recognized this fact.'87 They may have realized that a certain form of
political will could alter any part of the Constitution. 188 They must
have realized, however, that adding the Equal Suffrage Clause would
make it much more difficult to garner such political will. 89 Therefore,
said State." Id. at 728 (quoting Cong. Globe 36" Cong., 2d Sess. 1263 (1861)).
181. And it clearly may not. The arguments is simply that if a suitable number of
people find the structure of the Senate troublesome, we should be free to alter it.
182. See Murphy, supra note 97, at 706 ("Insofar as constitutional interpretation, its
two missions are to transform into a systematic unity the possibly conflicting clauses
of the constitutional document(s), as well the prescriptions of the broader
constitutional tradition; and, second, to distill from that unity a mutually consistent set
of jurisprudential values and principles, ranked in importance, that fit the developing
political system.").
183. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal,
111 Yale L.J. 1665, 1681-82 (2002).
184. See U.S. Const. art. V.
185. Id.
186. Many would, understandably, give great credence to what is a clear expression
of the Framers' original intent.
187. Though even if it had not been, the language still empowers us to make the
alterations, apart from any evidence of their desired result.
188. See Amar, Consent, supra note 53, at 459 (discussing Article V as simply the
exclusive source of amending power for the government).
189. See Fleming, supra note 98, at 363 ("[W]e can see that Article V entrenched
features of the Constitution that were vulnerable to being repealed through
democratic procedures, precisely because they manifested such deep compromises
with our constitutive principles and ordained such an imperfect Constitution.").
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even if one adheres to original intent, one could argue that the Equal
Suffrage Clause should still not be protected. 90 The Framers may
have intended to do exactly what the clause claims, but this aspiration
does not change the fact that they were attempting the impossible.
Now, if we choose to resolve this contradiction, we must do so
following particular procedural guidelines.
b. Why One is Bad and Two is Good
Although it might seem to be a technical point, whether the Senate
can be altered by amendment before eliminating the Equal Suffrage
Clause is a crucial issue. If altering the representative scheme of the
Senate after elimination of the Equal Suffrage Clause is
constitutional, one might ask why we are not permitted to simply
reform the Senate directly and declare that the clause is not binding.
Such an approach would be based, however, on a misreading of the
argument laid out above.
That we are free to reform the Senate is not due to the illegitimacy
of the Equal Suffrage Clause as it now stands. As long as the last line
of Article V is a part of our Constitution, an amendment that alters
the Senate's representation without the consent of the states would be
unconstitutional. 9' We are bound by the language of the document.
We are also empowered by it. If we determine that, for whatever
reasons, we want to strike the clause from the Constitution, we are
free to do so. But if the alteration of the Senate is also desired, the
clause must be removed first. This is not an overly formal or technical
adherence to the words of the Constitution. Believing that Congress
must redraft the Constitution before it remakes the Senate reflects
190. Professor Monaghan writes in his critique of Amar: "To my eyes, neither
completely state-centered nor completely nationalist views of the founding capture
the original understanding," adding, however, that "[flederalism, not national
consolidation, was the defining feature of the Constitution of 1787." Monaghan, supra
note 17, at 138. In either case, we are free to strike the balance where we wish. While
focusing on the original understanding may inform one's personal beliefs and help in
evaluating others' historical arguments, it is not dispositive. The fact that the Framers
struck a certain balance between the popular and the federal need not mean that we
must strike the same one. We are greatly limited by Article V, but not completely
restrained.
191. This is not to say that there are not other ways that the Senate might be
changed. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 45, at 68-84 (where the authors offer a
number of creative possibilities); see also supra note 48 (summarizing those
possibilities). In a conversation regarding these issues, Professor James E. Fleming
offered that it might be an open question whether Senators themselves-while on the
floor of the Senate--could simply consent to a change in their own suffrage in the
Senate. This possibility would permit reformation of the Senate outside Article V,
but, unlike Amar's arguments, would not be amending the Constitution itself. It
could be argued, however, that such a route would be, in effect, a Constitutional
amendment because it would make the Equal Suffrage Clause moot. For the
purposes of this Note, however, it is only necessary to point out that an amendment to
the text of the Constitution using extra-Article V methods would be illegitimate.
1046 [Vol. 72
SENATE REFORMATION
our adherence to the principle that we are bound by the explicit
language of our Constitution. Just because we are bound, however,
does not mean that we must blindly adhere to the original intentions
or dated interpretations of the text. In addition, we are not bound by
implied limitations.
c. Amendments as Death of the Constitution: An Argument Against
Implied Limitations on Amendment'92
Any theory that allows for anything to be amended in the
Constitution will inevitably run up against arguments for implied
limitations on the amending power.'93 James E. Fleming has noted
that lawyers' first reaction to the concept of an unconstitutional
amendment would be to claim that there could be no such thing;
however, when pressed, they might conclude otherwise: "[A]lmost all
lawyers might... believe that to adopt amendments purporting to
repeal certain unalienable fundamental rights (such as freedom of
speech and liberty of conscience) would be to repudiate our
constitutional order, not merely to ratify a valid constitutional
amendment."'94 Certain amendments are argued to be such radical
rejections of our constitutional structure that they would be
unconstitutional.
To the contrary, all amendments are a repudiation of the
constitutional order, just to differing degrees. 195 The clarification of
the succession to the presidency is an extremely minor repudiation of
past practice ordained by the Constitution,96 while the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments mark a clear break from a
previous Constitutional order. 97 That the latter do so does not make
them unconstitutional. Clearly, one can easily claim that repudiating
slavery' 98 is different from repudiating a cherished principle, such as
192. If a follow-up to this Note is ever written, the possible implications of the
Ninth Amendment may need to be addressed. By referencing unenumerated rights,
the Ninth Amendment could be read to create limitations on what could be amended
in the Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. IX. For the purposes of this Note, the
principle of equal representation could be one of these unenumerated rights (or for
that matter, could be seen as explicitly protected by provisions in the Constitution).
Therefore, amending the Equal Suffrage Clause would not raise the sorts of Ninth
Amendment problems other proposed amendments might raise. Certainly, others
might suggest that federalism is another right that is unenumerated and, therefore,
protected by the Ninth Amendment.
193. See supra Part II.D. (regarding implied limitations).
194. See Fleming, supra note 98, at 374.
195. See Amar, Consent, supra note 53, at 500 (rejecting the notion that an
amendment that "radically re-write[s] the text being amended" is no amendment at
all).
196. See U.S. Const. amend. XXV.
197. See U.S. Const. amend. XIII, XIV, XV.
198. See U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
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free speech, and rightly so. This distinction, however, is one of
morality, value, and right, not of constitutional legitimacy.
A constitution can be both immoral and legitimate. We do not
want such a constitution, and therefore are entrusted to protect
against it.'99 Rejecting implied limitations on amendment therefore
celebrates our responsibility to craft a better Constitution and will
ultimately create a citizenry that does not take its rights for granted."' °
Rejecting implied and entrenched limitations on amending the
Constitution may be unsettling to some,2 1 but it puts current citizens
on the same footing as those in the past,20 2 entrusting us with the job
of protecting the best parts of our founding charter0 3 and lancing the
worst.210
CONCLUSION
The Constitution provides both principles2 5 and the power for us to
reconstitute them. 20 6 The Framers only had the power to express what
they envisioned for the nation in the clearest language available to
them. It is our responsibility to apply the language as best we see fit,
to reestablish our Constitutional scheme when we deem it
appropriate. Certainly, this process will be contentious and,
considering how difficult it is to amend the Constitution, will likely
never lead to such an amendment. 207  In any event, we should free
ourselves from the constraints of the Equal Suffrage Clause at least to
199. We are entrusted to be perpetual framers. Article V gives us a road map for
determining the hurdles we must get over before changing our governmental scheme.
See U.S. Const. art. V. In this way we are in the same shoes as the Framers, and may
alter the substance of the Constitution as long as we stay true to the procedure that
legitimates our modern choices.
200. Even if we accept that there are rights that cannot be alienated from the
people, it still might be difficult to explain why eliminating them from the
Constitution would be illegitimate. If they are unalienable, then why must they be
enacted at all? And if enacting them is simply a reiteration of these rights, the
elimination of them from the text of the Constitution would not eliminate them from
existence. What would the actual harm be? If the harm is that the rights would no
longer be protected, then the view that rights--or at least rights with any substance-
are vested and divested by the will of the people is further supported.
201. See supra Part II.D.
202. See supra note 199.
203. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I, XIV.
204. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing each state with equal suffrage
in the Senate), art. V (entrenching that equal suffrage), art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (describing the
make-up of the Electoral College), amend. XVIII (prohibiting the sale and
consumption of alcohol), amend. XXI (repealing the 18th Amendment).
205. See supra note 141 (listing abstract principles).
206. See U.S. Const. art. V.
207. It may not be such a far-fetched proposition, however. It is conceivable that
population densities could become ever more polarized, leading to a situation where
it might be politically prudent for mid-sized states to help eliminate a senator from a
handful of incredibly over-represented small states and give an extra senator to a
handful of the largest states.
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the extent necessary to discuss the value of our representative
scheme.2 8  The debate surrounding the Senate and its underlying
values should resemble those surrounding other important and
controversial aspects of our Constitution.29 This debate is especially
important now that we live in a nation with more states; with ever
more transitory citizens; with greater population disparities;20 and in a
time after the passage of amendments expanding the franchise 21  and
governed by Supreme Court decisions disallowing voter dilution.2 2
208. This might only require a general recognition that the Equal Suffrage Clause
could be eliminated-even if it never is. Until that point, the issue of our
representation in the Senate may not be widely discussed because it will be deemed so
unlikely. See generally Baker & Dinkin, supra note 4 (discussing the unlikelihood of
their desired reform).
209. For example: What does "equal protection of the laws" require? U.S. Const.
amend XIV. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger,
123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal."); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 219-20 (1944) ("Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their
homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with
our basic governmental institutions. But when under conditions of modern warfare
our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger."); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
310 (1879) (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment was aimed at eliminating racial
discrimination and not meant to affect, for example, "males," "freeholders,"
"citizens," "persons within certain ages," or "persons having educational
qualifications").
What rights are protected, if any, by the Due Process Clauses in the
Constitution? U.S. Const. amend V, XIV. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472, 2478 (2003) ("The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to" express their relationship choices "in the confines of their
homes."), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (finding that there is no
"fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy").
How far does the right to speech extend? U.S. Const. amend I. See, e.g.,
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). What constitutes the free exercise of
religion? U.S. Const. amend I. See, e.g., Oregon Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
What is commerce? U.S. Const. art. I, § 7. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995); Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71
Fordham L. Rev. 2177, 2178-79 (2003) (describing differing interpretations of
"commerce" found in the Lopez decision).
210. See supra note 4; see also Baker & Dinkin, supra note 4, at 24-29 (explaining
how the allocation of representation in the Senate gives small states disproportionate
power).
211. See U.S. Const. amend XV (eliminating racial classifications in voting); U.S.
Const. amend XVII (providing for the election of senators by popular vote); U.S.
Const. amend XIX (extending the vote to women); U.S. Const. amend XXIV
(abolishing the poll tax); U.S. Const. amend XXVI (lowering the voting age).
212. See, e.g., Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 673
(1964) ("[W]hether or not the House is apportioned on a population basis, the
scheme of legislative representation in Maryland cannot be sustained under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, because of the gross disparities from
population-based representation in the apportionment of seats in the Maryland
Senate.").
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We are also over 200 years beyond the political compromises
necessary for ratification of the Constitution. 13
Our Constitution embodies grand principles as well as necessary
compromises,214 and allows us, through interpretation of broad
principles as well as formal amendment, to improve upon it. If one of
those compromises-one of the imperfections-resides within the
Equal Suffrage Clause of Article V, the clause should not be any less
open to revision. If entrenchment represents a compromise between a
value found in the Constitution and one we now hold more dear, 15
that alone is a strong justification for ridding ourselves of it.216 Maybe,
213. Although the Equal Suffrage Clause could be read to reflect a deep,
fundamental commitment to certain principles such as federalism, it might simply
protect compromises needed to assure passage at the time of the framing. See
Fleming, supra note 98, at 362-63.
Perhaps Article V entrenches provisions that reflect compromises with our
Constitution's constitutive principles: the protection of the African slave
trade with the principle that all persons are created equal, and the equal
representation of the states in the Senate with the principle of the equal
representation of citizens. The founders of the Constitution concluded that
both compromises were necessary to 'the forging of the union': the slave
states insisted upon the former, the small states upon the latter. Thus, both
imperfections were considered necessary 'to form a more perfect Union'
than the Articles of Confederation. From this standpoint... we can see that
Article V entrenched features of the Constitution that were vulnerable to
being repealed through democratic procedures, precisely because they
manifested such deep compromises with our constitutive principles and
ordained such an imperfect Constitution.
Id. at 362-63 (footnotes omitted). In The Federalist Papers, this sentiment is clearly
expressed:
[I]t is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the constitution
which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but "of a spirit
of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of
our political situation rendered indispensable." A common government,
with powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more
loudly by the political situation, of America.
The Federalist No. 62, supra note 8, at 316. The Senate itself was considered an evil,
though a lesser one than failure to enact the Constitution:
A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the
larger states, is not likely to be obtained from the smaller states. The only
option then for the former lies between the proposed government, and a
government still more objectionable. Under this alternative the advice of
prudence must be, to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a
fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to
contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the
sacrifice.
Id. at 316-17. It is not apparent why this compromise need survive over two centuries
of governmental and national development.
214. See Monaghan, supra note 17, at 121 ("Article V... illuminates the state-
oriented compromises and democracy-restraining features that were built into the
Constitution.").
215. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
216. Even without this greater justification, an amendment eliminating the Equal
Suffrage Clause would be legitimate. I only reference some of the arguments for
reforming the Senate as persuasive reasons why doing so would also resolve a conflict
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as one American People, we need to do some wild political dreaming
about "breaking down the lines which separate" us. 217
embedded in the Constitution. One who is not persuaded, in my view, is simply
disagreeing about the prudence of such change and using original intent to bolster
their argument. As already noted, the fact that original intent may be consistent with
the traditional view of entrenchment has no bearing on the legitimacy of reform, only
on its prudence.
217. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819). It should be
noted that many of the same arguments for ridding ourselves of the present Senate
scheme apply to the Electoral College, an institution that was prophetically critiqued
by Professor Amar: "The ingenious scheme of presidential selection set up by Article
II and refined by the Twelfth Amendment was a brilliant eighteenth century
invention that makes no sense today. Our system of selecting Presidents is a
constitutional accident waiting to happen." Akhil Reed Amar, A Constitutional
Accident Waiting to Happen, 12 Const. Comment. 143, 143 (1995).
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